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2009-08-17 China Times [Wu Mingjie / News Analysis]
The Ma administration didn’t know what was lacking in disaster relief, so the U.S. military directly provided the answer through action. On the tenth day after Typhoon Morakot struck, the U.S. military sent a C-130 transport aircraft carrying materials for prefabricated houses, not helicopters, because it was clear that Taiwan had missed the critical window for saving lives by not requesting foreign aid in the first place, making helicopters no longer an urgent need.
Government disaster relief prioritizes saving lives first, then aiding escape, followed by transporting supplies, restoring roads and bridges, then relocating victims and large-scale epidemic prevention . These stages are interlinked, and not a single moment can be delayed—especially for saving lives, as once the time passes, no amount of resources can make up for it.
Yet, a week after the 88 Floods ravaged southern Taiwan, the critical window for the first three stages of relief had already passed when the Ma administration finally accepted foreign aid, even requesting a super heavy-lift helicopter that doesn’t exist anywhere in the world. The AIT simply sent personnel south for an inspection and gave the Ma administration an answer the next day: a plane carrying prefabricated house materials, urging the government to quickly relocate victims—but not the helicopters the Ma administration had hoped for.
In fact, helicopters are highly sensitive. During the early stages of disaster relief, humanitarian concerns outweigh political disputes, lending legitimacy to their deployment. But days after the disaster, sending helicopters to Taiwan now would reignite political sensitivities overshadowing relief needs, leaving the U.S. military in a dilemma over whether to send them or not.
Had Taiwan sought international aid within a day or two of the disaster, not only would it have expedited the arrival of U.S. military supplies and personnel to help victims, but it would also have added another chapter to U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation. Instead, the Ma administration lost on both fronts.
Even more absurd, when the U.S. military transport plane delivered aid materials yesterday, the Ma administration still didn’t know how to use them—first transporting them from Tainan Airport to the 8th Army Corps, then back to Tainan Airport, going in circles only to leave them sitting in the same place.
Just from how the Ma administration handled the U.S. aid, it’s clear that even on the tenth day after the disaster, they still hadn’t figured out what they needed the aid for. The entire disaster relief system remained stuck in place, making no progress whatsoever.
Source: http:/ / news. chinatimes. com/ 2……2346+112009081700075,00. html
Government Missed Chance, US Aircraft in Dilemma
The Ma administration didn’t know what was lacking in disaster relief, so the U.S. military directly provided the answer through action. On the tenth day after Typhoon Morakot struck, the U.S. military sent a C-130 transport aircraft carrying materials for prefabricated houses, not helicopters, because it was clear that Taiwan had missed the critical window for saving lives by not requesting foreign aid in the first place, making helicopters no longer an urgent need.
Government disaster relief prioritizes saving lives first, then aiding escape, followed by transporting supplies, restoring roads and bridges, then relocating victims and large-scale epidemic prevention . These stages are interlinked, and not a single moment can be delayed—especially for saving lives, as once the time passes, no amount of resources can make up for it.
Yet, a week after the 88 Floods ravaged southern Taiwan, the critical window for the first three stages of relief had already passed when the Ma administration finally accepted foreign aid, even requesting a super heavy-lift helicopter that doesn’t exist anywhere in the world. The AIT simply sent personnel south for an inspection and gave the Ma administration an answer the next day: a plane carrying prefabricated house materials, urging the government to quickly relocate victims—but not the helicopters the Ma administration had hoped for.
In fact, helicopters are highly sensitive. During the early stages of disaster relief, humanitarian concerns outweigh political disputes, lending legitimacy to their deployment. But days after the disaster, sending helicopters to Taiwan now would reignite political sensitivities overshadowing relief needs, leaving the U.S. military in a dilemma over whether to send them or not.
Had Taiwan sought international aid within a day or two of the disaster, not only would it have expedited the arrival of U.S. military supplies and personnel to help victims, but it would also have added another chapter to U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation. Instead, the Ma administration lost on both fronts.
Even more absurd, when the U.S. military transport plane delivered aid materials yesterday, the Ma administration still didn’t know how to use them—first transporting them from Tainan Airport to the 8th Army Corps, then back to Tainan Airport, going in circles only to leave them sitting in the same place.
Just from how the Ma administration handled the U.S. aid, it’s clear that even on the tenth day after the disaster, they still hadn’t figured out what they needed the aid for. The entire disaster relief system remained stuck in place, making no progress whatsoever.
Source: http:/ / news. chinatimes. com/ 2……2346+112009081700075,00. html